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Case :'Jo.20150271 
IN THE 
lTTJJI COURT OF :\PPE"'.\LS 
CES.t\.R DiL"N1EL LOPEL 
Appellant1P etitioner, 
V. 
OGDEN CITY, 
Appel lee/Respondent. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Lopez appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-
conviction relief, challenging his conviction for retail theft, class B misdemeanor. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code _i\nn. §78A-4-103 and Rule 65C(q) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Lopez filed a petition for post-conviction relief. He acknowledged that his 
petition was not timely, but argued that he should nevertheless be allowed to 
proceed because the statute of limitations should be tolled. The petition was 
dismissed as untimely. 
~' 
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1. \\las the untimely petition properly dismissed because it was not filed 
within one year of accrual of the cause of action~ there are no statutory exceptions. 
and nothing tol1ed the one year period? 
Standard of Review: .l\.n appeal from an order dismissing a petition for post-
conviction relief is reviewed for correctness without deference to the lower court's 
vJ conclusions oflavv. rVinward Y. State~ 2012 CT 85 ~ ~6~ 293 P .3d 259. 
..., Did the district court properly grant the motion to dismiss because the 
petition was untimely and therefore failed to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted? 
Standard of RevieVt,: \Vhether a trial court properly granted a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon wruch relief can be granted is a question of 
~ laV\1 reviewed for correctness. Reynolds v. ·fVoodall~ 2012 UT App 206~ ~10~ 285 
P.3d 7. 
CONSTITCTIO:!\AL PROVISIONS. STA TI~TES, A.~l\1D RULES 
The following constitutional provisions. statutes. rules~ and regulations are 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
Statute of Limitations for post-conviction relief Utah Code i\.n.n. § 78B-9-107 
Preclusion of Relief, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case concerns a petition for Post-Convjction Remedies filed by Daniel 
Lopez (hereinafter referred to as ,:Lopez") requesting that his conviction in the 
Ogden City Justice Court be vacated and the charges against him dismissed. (Aplt. 
Bi-~ addendum A, p. 4 ). Ogden City (hereinafter referred as the '~City") filed a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 and 65C (k) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure since the petition was untimely. (Aplt. Br.. addendum B ). Lopez filed a 
memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss. (addendum B ). Lopez~ s petition 
was dismissed by the post-conviction court for being untimely without hearing. 
(Aplt. Br., addendum C). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Lopez was originally charged on November 22. 2010, with Unla\\ful 
Possession or Consumption of Alcohol by a Minor~ a class B misdemeanor~ and 
Retail Theft, a class B misdemeanor. (Aplt. Br., addendum B, p. 1 of the docket). 
At the arraignment held on November 22~ 20 l 0~ the defendant is appointed a 
public defender and enters a not guilty plea. (Aplt. Br.~ addendum B, p. 2 of the 
docket). The court indicates that Lopez has an ICE ho}d. 1 (Aplt. Br., addendum B, 
1 ICE indicates the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Counsel 
understands that an ICE hold means that U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement requests the defendant be released to them once the defendant is no 
longer being detained by the Justice Court. 
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p. 2 of the docket). A pre-trial conference is held on December 2. 2010. at which 
time Lopez, through his public defender~ requests a continuance because Lopez~ s 
parents had retained an immigration attorney. (Aplt. Br.. addendum B. p. 3 of the 
docket) .. Another pre-trial conference was held on December 9, 2010~ at which 
time Lopez, through his public defender, requests a bench which the court 
schedules for January 28, 2011. (Aplt. Br., addendum B, p. 4 of the docket). The 
court again notes that Lopez has an ICE hold. (Aplt. Br., addendum B, p. 4 of the 
docket). On January 28, 2011, Lopez enters into a plea negotiation in which he 
enters a guilty plea to the Retail Theft charge in exchange for the dismissal of the 
Unlawful Possession or Consumption of Alcohol by a Minor charge. (Aplt. Br., 
addendum B, p. 4 of the docket). After the court sentenced Lopez, the court states 
that Lopez may be released to immigration. (Aplt. Br.. addendum B, p. 5 of the 
docket). Lopez did not move to withdraw his plea and did not file an appeal for a 
trial de novo. (Aplt. Br., addendum B, p. 5 of the docket). On September 4, 2014, 
over three years after sentencing, Lopez filed a petition for post-conviction relief. 
(Aplt. Br., addendum A). Ogden City filed a motion to dismiss the petition as 
untimely. (Aplt. Br.~ addendum B). Lopez opposed the City's motion to dismiss 
by filing a memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss. ( addendum B ). The 
post-conviction court granted the City's motion to dismiss. (Aplt. Br., addendum 
C). Lopez timely appealed. 
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SCJ\1J\1.ARY OF ARGLl\1E~T 
The post-conviction court properly dismissed Lopez~ s untimely petition 
because he did not file it within one year of the date on wluch the cause of action 
accrued. The cause of action accrued on February 28, 2011, since Lopez failed to 
file an appeal for a trial de novo. The post-conviction court properly determined 
that the tolling provision of the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA.) did not apply. 
The Ogden City Justice Court had noted that Lopez had an I CE hold several times 
during the pendency of the case. Furthermore, the Ogden City Justice Court had 
continued a pre-trial conference because Lopez's parents had hired an immigration 
attorney. At the date for trial, plea negotiations had been reached and Lopez was 
sentenced. After sentencing Lopez, the Ogden City Justice Court indicated that he 
may be released to immigration. These facts are from the Official Court Docket 
from the Ogden City Justice Court and squarely contradict Lopez~ s argument for 
tolling the statute of limitations. 
I. 
i\RGUMENT 
THE POST-COI\'VICTIO~ COURT PROPERLY GRA __ 1\1ED THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE PETTION WAS UNTIMELY 
ON THE FACE OF THE PETITION. 
The post-conviction court properly granted the City's motion to dismiss the 
petition for post-conviction relief because it was untimely and therefore failed to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
5 
~i 
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A. The post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition because 
it was plain from the pleadings that Lopez did not file it within 
one year of accrual of the cause of action, and it therefore did not 
state a claim upon ·which relief could be granted. 
Under the PCR.i\, a "petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed 
within one year after the cause of action has accrued." Utah Code i\nn. § 78B-9-
~ 107(1 ). A cause of action accrues on the latest of the following relevant dates: 
( a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of 
conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
* * * 
( e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the 
petition is based; 
Utah Code .Aum. § 78B-9-l 07(2) . 
The petition was untimely because it was not filed within one year of entry 
of the final judgment. Lopez was sentenced on January 28, 2011. He did not file 
an appeal for a trial de novo. Therefore, his case became final on February 28, 
2011 ~ the last day for filing an appeal for a trial de novo. Lopez did not file his 
petition until September 5~ 2014, more than three (3) years after February 28, 2011, 
the last day for filing an appeal and the day which Lopez's cause of action accrued. 
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B. The district court property dismissed the petition because it was 
plain from the pleadings that the PRCA tolling provisions did not 
apply. 
ln the district court. Lopez did not dispute that his petition was late, but 
argued that the district court should excuse the late filing because the date of 
accrual for the cause of action was tolled. Lopez argued that only when he was 
hauled into immigration court for removal proceedings did he discover that this 
conviction had immigration consequences. (addendum B). As a result, Lopez 
argues the statute of limitations should be tolled. 
The district court reviewed the pleadings along with the official court docket 
and determined that there was no basis to toll the statute of limitations in this case. 
The official court docket has four different references to immigration. First, on 
~ovember 22~ 20 l 0~ at the arraignment~ the Ogden Justice Court's official court 
docket states that the defendant has an ICE hold. Secon4 on December 02, 2010, 
at a pre-trial conference the official court docket states that the pre-trial conference 
is continued because Lopez~s parents "have retained an immigration attorney." 
Third, on December 9. 2010, at the continued pre-trial, the official court docket 
states that the Lopez "has a bice [sic] hold"2. Finally, on January 28, 2011, at the 
scheduled bench trial, the court accepts the proposed plea bargain and sentences 
Lopez. The Ogden Justice Court~ s official court docket states that Lopez may be 
: 1n the court docket. bice is used instead of ice which seems to be a typo. 
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released to immigration. The district court based its decision that the limitations 
period did not begin to run as soon as Lopez affirmatively knew of the evidemiary 
facts forming the basis of his petition, but rather when Lopez '·should have known,. 
~ of those facts through the exercise of '·reasonable diligence.,~ As result. there 
should be no tolling of the statute of limitations. 
Tne district court found that the statute of limitations began to run during 
Petitioner·s misdemeanor proceedings before the Ogden City Justice Court OL at 
the latest, immediatelv fol1owimr his sentencin2 and not within the last vear when 
• .,I ._,., fi,,,.,,, ~ 
Petitioner began contending remo\'al proceedings. (Aplt. Br., addendum C). The 
Court indicated that Lopez must file his petition within one year after "the date on 
which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petitioner is base.'· Specifically. the 
Court noted that the limitations period does not begin to run as soon as Petitioner 
affirmatively knO'ws of the evidentiary facts forming the basis of his petition~ but 
rather when the Petitioner '·should have known'~ those facts through the exercise of 
"reasonable diligence.,. The court referred to the Ogden City Justice's official 
v;; court docket regarding Petitioner· s misdemeanor proceedings~ Petitioner was 
granted a continuance on December 2~ 2010. because Lopez· s parents retained an 
"immigration attorney.'~ The court determined that these official docket entries 
represented instances where the Petitioner - through the exercise of diligent efforts 
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- should have fu.70V\TI of the potential of impending immigration concerns that 
could accompany his guilty plea. 
In Lopez~s petition~ paragraph 11 states that the ~"Statute of Limitations 
under G.C.A. 78B-9-107(e:) is tolled because Petitioner first became aware of the 
eYidentiary facts on which the petition is based within the past on [sic] year after 
reviewing his crii"Ilina1 proceedings with his new counsel. He would have raised 
the issues sooneL if not for the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.'~ 
Furthermore~ paragraph 17 of Lopez~ s petition states Lopez '\\'as not informed 
about consequences this guilty plea would have on his immigration status." Also, 
paragraph 21 ofLopez·s petition states that the failure ofLopez~s ';public defender 
to apprise him of the possible immigration consequences of his guilty [sic] was a 
violation of Cesar's constitutional rights.~, These paragraphs are squarely 
contradicted by the official court docket. 
In paragraph 3 of Lopez~ s petition~ Lopez directly cites to the Ogden City 
Justice Court~ s case, fo.us incorporating it into his petition. The Ogden City 
Justice Courr· s docket clearly indicates that Lopez was in the custody of ICE 
during the Ogden Justice Court case. A continuance was granted since it was 
represented to the Justice Court that Lopez's parents had hired an immigration 
attorney. \\'hen the case was over, the court released Lopez to immigration. It is a 
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reasonable inference that Lopez knevv' or should have known there \\7ere 
immigration consequences. 
There is a distinction between knowledge of evidentiary facts and 
appreciation of their legal significance. °Vv7 ell-established federal case laV\· applying 
a similar statute of limitations in the federal habeas corpus context illustrates the 
distinction. Under 28 United States Code section 2244, the one-year limitation 
period runs from "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.,~ 28 
U.S.C. §2244(d) (l)(D). "Factual predicate" under the federal statute is no 
different than "evidentiary facts" under the PCR.~. 
Under federal case law, the time "begins when the prisoner knows ( or 
through diligence could discover) the important facts~ not when the prisoner 
recognizes their legal sign[ficance. ,. Owens ,·. Boyd~ 23 5 F .3d 3 56~ 3 59 (7th Cir. 
2000) (emphasis added). If the habeas statute of limitations "'used a subjective 
rather than an objective standard, then there would be no effective time limit.'~ Id. 
Therefore~ it is not when Lopez learns that his conviction has immigration 
consequences, but rather when Lopez knew, or though reasonable diligence could 
have been known~ there were immigration consequences. The facts creating his 
~ immigration consequences were either known to Lopez, or through reasonable 
diligence could have been known, at the time of sentencing. In this case, Lopez 
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with reasonable diligence could have timely taken appropriate legal action to 
oreserve anv cause of action he mav have had. 
J. ol ., 
II. THE CITY PROPERLY RAISED THE TIME-BAR DEFENSE IN A 
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSU .. \..~T TO RULE 12 A-"l\1D 65C(k) OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Lopez argues t.hat the district court erred when it dismissed Lopez~ s petition 
wjthout hearing any evidence of whether the tolling provisions applies. Or in other 
words. on a motion to dismiss. the Court must treat ';the factual a11e£ations in the 
,, ,' -.,.. 
complaint as true and consider them, and all reasonable inferences to be dravm 
from them, in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.'' St. Benedict ·s Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991 ). 
The dismissal should be affirmed because the statute of limitations time bar 
defense was properly raised in a motion to dismiss, and the district coUI1 was free 
to consider a time-bar defense. The Ci!)-~s motion to dismiss was filed pursuant to 
Rule 12 and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 65C governs 
post-conviction relief. It states that "~the respondent shall answer or otherwise 
respond." Rule 65C(k) ( emphasis added). The rule then anticipates that the 
respondent may fi)e a motion to dismiss - "after service of any motion to dismiss 
or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the 
motion." Rule 65C(k)). 
11 
~: 
~' 
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FurtheL Rule 12(b) provides that every defense "'shall be asserted in a 
responsive pleading thereto if one is required~ except' certain defenses "'may at the 
option of the pleader be made by motion." Tnis includes "failure to state a claim 
~ upon which relief can be granted.'. In addition: "[a] motion making any of these 
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted." Utah R. 
vi Civ. P. 12 (b) ( emphasis added). 
The respondent in a post-conviction case~ '~like any other party obligated to 
~ file an answer - has the option to assert certain defenses by motion." Maxfield v. 
Herbert, 2012 UT 44, r19. 284 P.3d 647. This includes the affirmative defense 
that a statute of limitations has expired. Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
2002 lTf 54, ,r8, 53 P.3d 947; Mast v. First Madison Services 1 Inc., 2009 UT App 
162U. "A complaint showing that the governing statute of limitations has run on 
the plaintiffs claim for relief is the most common situation in which the 
affLrrr1ative defense appears on the face of the pleading and provides as basis for a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b )(6)." SB Charles .Alan ~ 7right et al.~ Fed. Prac. 
& Proc. Ci-v. §1357 (3d ed. 2013). 
Utah case law clearly holds that motions to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim may raise affirmative defenses when they appear within the complaint. 
"' Tucker, 2002 CT 54; see also Van de Gr[ft v. State, 2013 lJT 11, f23, 299 P.3d 
1043; and Foster v. Saunders, 2005 CT App 264U. 
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That is all the City did here. fr1 this case~ the time-bar defense - :hat the 
petition was untimely because it was fi1ed beyond the one year statute of 
limitations - clearly appeared on the face of the petition. Lopez cites to the case in 
paragraph 3 of his petition. As stated previously~ Lopez~s alleges he was not 
informed of immigration consequences at the time of his plea. However, the 
official court docket clearly indicates that immigration consequences were being 
considered since the docket clearlv indicates a continuance beimr srranted so an 
., - --
immigration attorney could be consulted. Furthermore, Lopez had an ICE hold 
and was released to immisrration after sentencin£. All reasonable inferences 
'- .._ 
indicate Lopez knew or should have known there were potential immigration 
consequences. These facts clearly contradict his petition. 
Furthermore, Lopez· s petition fails to specify when the immigration 
consequences were found out. \\7hi1e the official court docket clearly indicates 
immigration consequences where being considered, Lopez should have known, 
after reasonable diligence~ that there could be immigration consequences. The 
facts Lopez relies on existed immediately after sentencing. Lopez had an 
opportunity to reasonably and diligently pursue these issues and file an appeal for a 
trial de novo or file a PRCA petition within the one year statute of limitations 
period. 
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Further, the PCR . .\ rejects the formalistic approach Lopez advocates. It 
specifically authorizes the City to "~raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at 
any time.,. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(2 ). Likewise~ it authorizes the court to 
~ deny relief on time-ba.rred petitions even when the Ciry never raises that defense. 
Id. 
A motion to dismiss, like- the one filed here~ will better alert a petitioner to 
what he needs to do to avoid a time bar. If the City had filed a bare answer, it 
would have only had to state, "The petition is untimely.'~ But Lopez knew that his 
petition was late. By using a motion to dismiss. the City told Lopez how it 
calculated the time and effectively directed him to the tolling provision by pointing 
out that he had not asserted that the limitations period was tolled. Lopez did not 
add any information for the court to consider in his response to the 1'1otion to 
dismiss. For example~ an affidavit that provided more specifics rather than general 
allegations of the petition. The time-bar defense was properly raised in a motion to 
dismiss and the dismissal should be affirmed. 
In addition~ the motion to dismiss was filed under Rule 12 and Rule 65C. 
Rule 65C governs post-conviction petitions. and post-conviction petitions are very 
different from the notice pleadings in most typical civil cases. Rule 65C states 
~ what should be included in a petition. It specifies that, if available, the petitioner 
'·shall attach~~ to the petition ''affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in 
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support of the aUesm:ions.'· Utah R. Civ. P. 65C (e:>(1 ). In a post-conviction case, 
these required attachrnems are part of the pleadii-ig. In considering a motion to 
dismiss~ the court may consider items that are deemed to be a part of the complaint, 
such as items appearing in the record of the case and attachments to the complaint. 
In determining whether to grant a Federal Rule 12(b)(6) motion, 
district cotuts primarily consider the allegations in the complaint. The 
court is not limited to the four come:-s of the complainL however. 
Numerous cases . . . have allowed consideration of matters 
incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to 
judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the 
record of the case~ and exhibits attached to the complaint whose 
authenticity is unquestioned: these items may be considered by the 
district judge without converting the motion into one for summary 
judgment. These matters are deemed to be a part of every complaint 
by implication. 
5A Charles Alan V\1right & .l\rthur R. :Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
§1357, see alsoAlvarezv. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987,990, fn6 (Utah 1997). Even if 
the post-conviction court cited facts from the c:i.minal record or from items 
attached to the petition or motion to dismiss, in a post-conviction case, those items 
are part of the pleading. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons~ the Court should affirm the dismissal of the 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
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Respectfully submitted September 25, 2015. 
'V\1m. Greg 
Counsel for Respondent/ Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLL\SCE 
I certify that in compEance ~·ith Rule 24(f)l 1 ), l:tah R. App. P -~ this brief 
contains 3~889 words, excluding the table of contents~ table of authorities, and 
addenda. I further certify that in compliance with rule 27(b\ Utah R. App. P., this 
brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using lvficrosoft V\iord 
2010 in Times ~ew Roman 14 poiI1t. 
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Attorney for Appellant 
Also~ in accordance ·with Utah Supreme Court Standing Order No. 8, a 
courtesy brief on CD in searchable portable document format (pdf): 
= was filed with the Court and served on appellant. 
4i'be filed and served within 14 days. 
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Utah Code Ann. iS 788-9-107 
S~atutes current tnrough tne 20: 5 General Session 
Utah Code Annotated > Title 78B Judicial Code > Chapter 9 Postconviction Remedies Act 
> Part 1 General Provisions 
78B-9-107 . Statute of limitations for postconviction relief. 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petit1or. is filed within one year after the cause of action has 
accrued. 
(2) For purposes of tnis section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following dates: 
{a) the last day for filing an appeal from tne entry of the fir.al judgment of conviction. if no apoeai is taker.; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is 
taken; 
{c) the iast aay for fiiing a petition for wri: of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court or the United States 
Supreme Court. if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition for 
certiorari review. if a petition for wri~ of certiorari is filed: 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of 
evidentiary facts on which the petition is based; or 
{f) the date on which the new rule described in SubsecUor: 788-9-104( 1) (f! is established. 
{3) The iimitations period is tolled for any period during which the petitioner was prevented from filing a petition 
due to state action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity. The 
petitioner has the burden of oroving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is entitled to 
relief under this Subsection (3). 
(4) The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of the outcome of a petition asserting: 
(a) exoneration through DNA testing under Se:tion 783-9-303; or 
{b) factual innocence under Section 788-8-401. 
{5) .Sections 77-19-8, 788-2-104. and 788-2-111 do not extend the limitations period established in this 
section. 
History 
C. 1953. 78-'12-31.1, enacted by L. 1995. ch. 82. S 1; renumbered by L. 1996. ch. 235. l 7: 2004. :;h. 139. 
S 2; renumbered by L. 2008. ch. 3. 6 1171; 2008. ch. 288. ~ B; 2008. ch. 358. C 1. 
Utah Code Annotated 
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Utah Code Ann, § 78B-9-106 
Statutes current through tne: 2:115 General Sessior, 
Utah Code Annotated > Title 78B Judicial Code > Chapter 9 Postconviction Remedies Act 
> Part 1 General Provisions 
78B-9-106. Preclusion of relief - Exception. 
(1) A person is no: eligibie for relief under this chapter uoon any ground that: 
{a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-rr1al motion; 
(2) 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeat: 
(c) couid have been bu: was not raised at thal or on appeal: 
(d) was :-alsed or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but was 
not raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78S-S-1G7. 
{a) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, including during the state's 
aopea; from an order granting post-conviction relief, unless the court determines that the state should 
have raised the time bar or procedural bar at an earlier time. 
{b) Any court may raise a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, provided that it gives the parties 
notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
{3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1 ){c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have 
been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
(4) This section authorizes a merits review only to the extent required to address the exception set forth in 
Subsection {3). 
History 
C. 1953, 78-35a-106. enacted by L. 1996. ch. 235. ~ 6: renumbered by L. 2008. ch. 3. cS 1170; 2008. ch. 288. 
6 5: 2010. ch. 45. 6 1. 
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Jason B. Richards #13341 
RICHARDS LAW GROL-P~ P.C. 
2568 Washington Blvd. Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 781-2026 
Facsimiie: (801) 334-9662 
Email: jason@jbrla\\ryers.com 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE SECON"D DISTRICT COURT IN _.\...1'/1) FOR 
WEBER COD'NTY, STATE OF ULIB 
CESAR DA .... 1\JlEL LOPEZ ) :MEMORA-~"TilJM LN OPPOSillON 
TO OGDEN CITY'S MOTION TO 
Petitioner, ) DIS1v1ISS .A ... l\ffi REQUEST FOR 
0 R.A.L .A.R.GlJJv.lE!\1TS 
VS. ) 
OGDEN CITY ) Case No. 140905670 
Respondent. ) Judge: Ernie W. Jones 
Cesar Daniel Lopez ("Petitioner" or '"Cesar"), by and through counsel undersigned, 
submits the following Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent Ogden City's ('~Respondent'') 
Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, Petitioner requests that the Court schedule oral arguments on 
Respondent~ s Motion. 
1. Petitioner filed his Verified Petition for Relief Under fue Post Conviction Remedies Act 
(the "Petition") on Septemb_er 5, 2014. 
2. The Coun issued an Order on 11/10/2014 ordering Respondent Ogden City to respond to 
the Petition. 
3. Respondent ftled a Morion to Dismiss the Petition and accompanying memoranda on 
12/10/2014. 
Firm: 2014102 
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4. T.ne due date for Petitioner t0 respond to this Motion was 12/24/2014 and was extended 
to 01/091.2015 based on an agreement between the pa.mes. 
5. Petitioner filed a second morion to dismiss on 12/26/2014, but it appears that it is idential 
to the motion filed on 12/10/2014. 
6. Petitioner is essentially alleging three issues in his Petition. First he is alleging that he 
was not afforded his rights under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. As a 
corollary, because he was not informed of certain constimtional rights his guilty plea was 
not entered knowingly and voluntarily. 
7. Second, Petitioner is alleging that he was not apprised of the effects this conviction may 
have on his immigration status, in violation of his due process rights as outlined in the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
8. Thir~ Petitioner is alleging that the aforementioned errors primarily occurred because of 
inn.effective assistance of his trial counsel. 
9. Petitioner alleges that he would have petitioned the court for post-conviction releif 
sooner, if not for ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. 
10. Petitioner alleges that the statute oflimitations outlined in U.C.A. §78B-9-107(e) is tolled 
because Petitioner first became aware of the evidentiary facts on which the petition is 
based within the past on year after reviewing his criminal proceedings with his new 
counsel. He would have raised the issues sooner, if not for the ineffective assistance of 
his trial counsel. 
.ARGUMENT 
Respondent raises two issues in its Motion. First, Respondent argues that Petitioner's 
claims are procedurally barred because he failed to file a notice of appeal, or seek a trial de novo, 
2 
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a: the district court following his comiction. Second.. Respondent argues that Petitioner's claims 
are time-barred under Utah Code A.rm.§ -:'8B-9-107(1f 
\\7ben reviewing a motion to dismiss: the Coun must treat '"the facmal allegations in the 
complaint as rrue and consider them: and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiff': Sr. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 
194: 196 (Utah 1991 ). The Court must then decide that, even if all of the facts contained in the 
complaint are true, that the Plaintiff is still not entitled to the relief it seeks. Jd. 
Under the Post Conviction Remedies Act ('"PCR. .\."), "a person who has been convicted 
and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district coun ... for post-conviction 
relief to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence" upon certain grounds. See § 78B-9-104( 1) 
§ 78B-9-104 outlines the grounds that a person may challenge their conviction. Primarily, the 
Petitioner is seeking a reversal of his conviction because his conviction was obtained in violation 
of his constitutional rights. (see~ 20-23 of Petition). 
I. THE PETITIOl\" IS NOT PROCEDlTR .. liL Y BA.RR.ED 
Respondent argues that the Petition must be dismissed because Petitioner failed to file a 
~orice of Appeal in District Court. First, Respondent argues that§ 78B-9-106(c) precludes 
petitioner from seelcing relief under the PCR.t\ if it is based on grounds that could have been 
raised at trial or on appeal. Se:ondly, Respondent argues that the petitioner must have exhausted 
all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal. It is true that, generally, "any issues that were 
not addressed on direct appeal but could have been :raised may not be raised for the first time in a 
postconviction proceeding absent unusual circumstances." Rudolf v. Galetka, 43 P .3d 467 (Utah 
2002). The 2008 amendments to the PRCA effectively rrumped the unusual circumstances test as 
~ All future staru.tory references refe:- !O the Utan Code . .,<\rm. uniess indicated otherwise. 
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outlined by Hurst -r. Caok~ -: .... , P .2d 1029 (Utah~ ~ 989). As stated, and attested to by the 
Petitioner. in the Petition, Petitioner did not raise the issues in the trial coun· or on direct appeal 
because be did not know the defects existed until weli after the time period to file a morion to 
withdraw his plea or to file a notice of appeal had expired. Therefore, pursuant to § 77-13-6( c ), 
Petitioner~ s only recourse to challenge his guilty plea is through the PCRA ... (Stating that ''any 
challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be 
pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure.) Respondenf s moving papers do not address the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. 
Essentially, Respondent's argument is foreclosed by§ 78B-9-106(3). Respondent's 
position is that Petitioner cannot seek relief through the PCRA because he should have raised the 
issues at a trial de novo or on appeal.§ 78B-9-106(3) states: "Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), 
a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised 
at trial or on appeat if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel." Petitioner states that he would have sought redress of his conviction through an appeal-
but, due to the ineffectiveness of his counsel~ he did not. Petitioner should have the opportunity 
to present evidence of I. the impact this conviction had on his immigration status and 2. that he 
would have sought redress of the conviction through the normal channel of a trial de novo if not 
for the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. Petitioenr also alleges that at the time of the entering 
of his plea, he was not informed of his rights under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Specifically, Cesar was not informed of his right to a public trial, his right to 
·withdraw his guilty plea, and that the guilty plea may impact his immigration status. As the 
plaintiff, Petitioner should be afforded the benefit of the doubt and be allowed to have his day in 
4 
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court. 
Respondenfs reliance on Lucero v. Kennard: 2005 "CT 79: 125 P.3d 9i; J:tah 2005) is 
misplaced and the case at bar is distinguishable. In Lucero, a justice court defendant attacked his 
conviction through the PCR.A because he was denied his right to counsel in the justice coun 
proceedings. Because be appeared pro se at the trial level, the exceptions to the preclusions to 
relief outlined in § 78B-9-106(3) were not invoked. The Court in Luceo held that "when a 
defendant elects to proceed pro se, is convicted, and subsequently attacks the conviction or 
sentence based on a deprivation of the right to counsel, the court must determine whether the 
defendant exercised the •right to self-representation voluntarily: knowingly~ and intelligently."' 
Id. quoting: in pan Relief Available for Violation of Right to Counsel at Sentencing in State 
Criminal Trial, 65 A.LR.4th 183 (2004). In this case, Cesar was represented by counsel and his 
petition alleges that, due to the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, his constitutional rights were 
violated. That alone is enough to overcome the procedural hurdles imposed by the PCRA.. and is 
enough to overcome Respondenf s motion to dismiss. 
II. PETITIO:N-:ER'S CLAIMS ARE NOT TIME BARRED "C:N""DER § 78B-9-107(1). 
Respondent argues that Petitioner~ s claims are time-barred because the petition was not filed 
within the statute oflimitations period as outlined in§ 78B-9-107(1). The law states '"a petitioner 
is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause of action has 
accrued." Id. § 78B-9-107(2) defines when a cause of action has "accrued": For the purposes of 
this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of 
conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the 
case, if an appeal is taken; 
c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court 
or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed; 
Firm: 2014102 5 
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( d) the entry of the denial of the petition for \vrit of certiorari or the entry of the 
decision on the petition for certiorari review~ if a petition for writ of certiorari is 
filed; 
( e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have kno\'\~ in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence~ of evidentiary facts on whicn the petition is based 
Petitioner bas alleged that he first became aware of the evidentiary facts upon which the petition 
is based within the last year when he was haled in from of immigration court for removal 
proceedings. Petitioner has alleged that only then did he discover that this conviction contained 
immigration consequences that were not disclosed to him by his triai counsel. Petitioner has 
alleged that only then did he discover the irregularities of bis conviction. Therefore based on the 
allegations of the Petition, the facts of which were personally verified by the Petitioner, the one-
year statute of limitations has not expireQ because Petitioner became aware of the evidentiary 
facts upon which his petition is based within the last year, as subsection ( e) anticipates. 
Because Petitioner filed his petition within the last year, he is well within the statute of 
limitations. As stated above, when revievling a motion to dismiss, the Court must treat "the 
factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). The Court must then decide that, "even if all 
of the facts contained in the complaint are true, that the Plaintiff is still not entitled to the relief it 
seeks." Id. Respondent correctly argues that it is Petitioner's burden to disprove the existence of 
preclusion to relief under the PCRA by a preponderance of the evidence. Again, when reviewing 
a case at the dismissal stage, the Court must take what the Plaintiff is alleging at face value. 
Petitioner states that he first became aware of the constitutional defect in this conviction within 
the last year, and has attested to such in his Petition. The Respondent has offered no substantive 
allegation that this is not the case. The Court can only make a determmation about what the 
6 
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Petitioner should have kn0Vv11 after hearing evidence. Again~ the task the Court is given he:re is 
whether or noL on its face, Petitioner~ s claims entitle him to relief. The Court has already made a 
determination that the petition is not frivolous and has genuine issues of material fact. Taken at 
face value, the Court must assume that Petitioner first learned about the constitutional problems 
·with bis conviction within the last year. Petitioner can only further establish his case by 
presenting evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent is aslcing the Court to dismiss petitioner's claims without hearing any 
evidence. As stated previously, the Coun must treat "the factual allegations in the complaint as 
true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be draw-u from them in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff.'' St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P .2d 194, 196 
(Utah 1991). Utah Courts have consistently held that a dismissal is "a severe measure and should 
be granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any state 
of facts which could be proved in support of its claim." Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 
Utah 457, 460, 243 P.2d 441, 443 (1952). Courts exist as a forum for settling controversies, and 
"if there is any doubt about whether a claim should be dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, 
the issue should be resolved in favor of giving the pany an opportunity to present its prooC' 
Baur v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 14 Utah 2d 283,284, 383 P .2d 397, 397 (1963). Finally, when 
reviewing a motion to dismiss the court must accept the material allegations of the complaint as 
true" Petersen v. Jones, 16 Utah 2d 121, 122, 396 P.2d 748, 748 (1964). 
Petitioner has alleged that, due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, that his 
constitutional rights were violated. He is now facing imminent depor:ration because of this 
conviction and be bas alleged that he first became aware of these violations and defects within 
Ffrm: 2014102 7 
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the last year. Petitioner has substantial rigbts on the line that can oniy be properly presented to 
the Court through e,idence. 
"\X.lIEREFORE, Petitioner asks that the Conn deny Respondent's Morion and gjve him 
his day TIJ. Court. Furthermore, Petitioner requests that the Court scheduled oral arguments on 
Respondem:s motion at a time that is converuent for the coun and all panies. 
DATED this 8th day of January 2015. 
RlCH..A.RDS LAW GROUP, P.C. 
/s/ Jason B. Richards 
JASON B. RICH.A.RDS 
Anorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SER\i1CE 
I certify that on the 8th day of January 2015 I delivered a nue and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMOR.A.NTilJM IN OPPOSITION TO OGDEN CITY'S MOTION TO DISMrSS 
.A....~"D REQUEST FOR OR.A.l ARGlJME:!\'TS was served electronically, via email~ on the below 
named attorneys pursuant to UCJA Rule 4-503. 
Wm. Gregory Burdett 
Michael S. Junk 
Isl Jason B. Richards 
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